For its “MWP 01 & 19 Alkali Surfactant Polymer (ASP) Flood” at Barmer, Rajasthan, as part of Process Hazard Analysis (PHA), CAIRN India has hired iFluids Engineering to conduct a Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) research at HAL OFFSHORE in Mumbai.
In a joint venture with ONGC, Vedanta Limited, Cairn Oil & Gas is the operator of Contract area RJ-ON- 90/01 in Rajasthan, Northwest India. In the RJON-90/01 block, they found oil and gas fields that they named Mangala, Aishwariya, Bhagyam, Saraswati, Shakti, Raageshwari, and others. The largest oil fields, Mangala, Bhagyam, and Aishwariya, are situated in the northern region of RJ block. The Mangala Processing Terminal (MPT) in Rajasthan’s Barmer district processes the output from each well pad of the Mangala, Bhagyam, and Aishwariya oil fields, as well as from other satellite fields.
One of the important fields that was first formed during a water flood and is currently experiencing a polymer flood is Mangala. Cairn plans to install ASP flood as a component of Mangala FM1 Layer in Mangala based on the results of the ASP Pilot trial in the Mangala field. Well Pads 01 and 19 have been chosen for Phase 1 ASP Flood Implementation as part of the early implementation strategy.
The following is a list of the various components of the building.
- Soften Water Sourcing, Storage and Pumping
- TDS Increase Package
- Soften Water Heating
- ASP solution preparation and injection package
- Alkali handling and storage System
- Surfactant handling and storage System
- Polymer handling and storage System
- ASP Solution storage vessel
- ASP Injection Pumping System
- Production fluid gathering
- Additional Well Pad Facilities
- Pipelines
- Soften Water Pipeline
- ASP Solution Transfer Pipeline
- Production Fluid pipeline
- Utility system
The ASP project scope is to carry out Hazard and Operability (HAZOP), Hazard Identification (HAZID) & Safety Integrity Level (SIL) study for MWP 01 & 19 Alkali Surfactant Polymer (ASP) Flood at Barmer, Rajasthan which includes soften water sourcing, TDS increase, heating, ASP solution preparation & injection, gathering and tie-in of production fluid to existing LSF, well hook ups, manifolds and flow lines, pipelines, necessary utilities, chemical dosing skids, electrical and instrumentation infrastructure etc.
HAZOP
- The primary objective of a HAZOP study is to identify potential hazards and operability problems of process plant facilities.
- Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) is a systematic and rigorous method for conducting a comprehensive analysis of process systems, focusing on the identification of deviations from intended design parameters and their potential consequences. Employing a structured approach with the aid of guide words, HAZOP seeks to unravel the intricate interactions between process variables, equipment, and operations to assess the inherent risks, ultimately leading to data-driven decisions and recommendations for risk reduction and operational improvement.
- A group of individuals familiar with the layout and functioning of the facility conducts the research while working under the direction of a HAZOP leader.
HAZOP METHODOLOGY
Approach to HAZOP involves several repetitive steps:
- Locate a plant section on the P&IDs.
- Describe the section’s intended use and typical operating circumstances.
- Use a set of guidewords to spot a departure from the design intent or operating conditions.
- Determine the deviation’s potential causes and effects. A deviation may be thought of meaningful if it can lead to negative outcomes or operational problems and has a plausible source.
- Choose what action, if any, is required in the event of a significant divergence.
- Record the discussion and action.
Repeat steps 3 through 6 until the team is confident that all significant variations have been taken into account and all guidewords have been exhausted. After that, the team continues the process for the following section of the plant by going back to step 1.
HAZID
- The objective of a HAZID study is to identify potential hazards, evaluate the risk qualitatively and suggest appropriate mitigating measures, if applicable.
- A facility risk assessment starts with hazard identification. To guarantee that as many threats are detected as possible, it is crucial that it be done thoroughly and methodically.
- A hazard is defined as a characteristic of the system that represents a potential for an accident with an undesirable consequence. Risk, however, is defined, as a measure of potential economic loss or human injury in terms of the probability of the loss or injury occurring and the magnitude of the loss or injury if it occurs.
- It’s crucial to identify the primary risks throughout the early stages of design in order to make choices that lower risk. HAZID may be useful for achieving this objective.
- If the required information is available, the evaluation of risks and hazards should begin as soon as feasible so that it can have a positive impact on development rather than acting as a stumbling block that necessitates more labor and costs.
- The stated objectives of a HAZID review are to:
- Identify all potential hazardous events and their significance to safe operations;
- Identify the potential impact/s on personnel, the asset, or the environment;
- Identify existing safeguards (also termed Barriers);
- (If existing safeguards are considered inadequate) propose actions to undertake further hazard assessment and identify additional risk reduction measures by eliminating hazards, or by putting barriers in place to prevent the realization of the hazards, or to control or mitigate the effects of the hazards
HAZOP & HAZID study for ASP flood project of CAIRN Oil & Gas was conducted in presence of multi- disciplinary team from various departments such as Process Engineering, Process Safety, Projects, Instrumentation, Maintenance, Electrical etc.
Facilities included in the aforementioned safety evaluations are
- Mangala well pad – 01 (MP-01)
- Mangala well pad – 19 (MP-19)
MWP-19 is a new well pad and has the wells drilled. Hence, the facilities shall be developed as part of this project to make it operational. From the facilities described above, the following units were considered at MWP-19
- Injection Well (Wells already drilled)
- Instrument Air Package
- N2 package
- Chemical Injection Skids
The team documented the results of the HAZOP and HAZID studies and made appropriate recommendations after discussing them among themselves. Utilizing fundamental engineering documents including PFD, P&ID, Process Design Basis (PDB), and plot plans, HAZOP and HAZID were carried out unit by unit, while HAZOP employing P&IDs and Cause & Effect (C&E) diagrams was followed by SIL research. On the basis of the session’s findings, suggestions were put forth. There were also some general recommendations for the entire organization.