Qatar Gas Operating Company Limited has awarded iFluids Engineering to conduct Technical safety & Risk engineering services for offshore and onshore facilities for 5 years framework contract . Qatargas is currently operating its offshore and onshore facilities for extraction of gas from offshore fields, treatment of gas and production of liquefied natural gas (LNG) and various products, as well as for refining, storing, and loading LNG, sulfur and liquid products.
The onshore facilities are located in the North-West corner of RasLaffan Industry City (RLIC) & Offshore facilities are located in the North Project Area of the North Field, approximately 64 to 93 kilometers off the north-eastern tip of the State of Qatar. Due to the continuous modification & installation of new & existing facilities the company requires to have Technical Safety and Risk Engineering study to be carried out by iFluids Engineering.
Facilities to be covered under the Study includes Onshore & Offshore
Onshore Facilities are divided into 4 (four) operating groups:
- Onshore LNG North
- The Onshore LNG North facilities are designed to produce 42 million tons per annum (mtpa) Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) from seven (7) LNG process trains. The facilities consist of the following assets:
- QG1 – three (3) LNG trains, 3.2mtpa each
- QG2 – two (2) mega trains, 7.8mtpa each
- QG3/4 – two (2) mega trains, 7.8mtpa each
2. Onshore LNG South
- The Onshore South facilities are designed to produce 36.6 million tons per annum (mtpa) Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) from seven (7) LNG process trains. The facilities consist of the following assets:
- Ras Laffan Liquefied Natural Gas I (Train-1 & 2) - 3.43 mtpa each
- Ras Laffan Liquefied Natural Gas II (Train-3, 4 & 5) - 4.71 mtpa each Ras Laffan Liquefied Natural Gas III (Train-6 & 7) –7.8 mtpa each
- Al-Khaleej Gas (AKG) –1&2 : NGLs (C3 & C4) and Sales gas- 785 MMSCFD and 1381 MMSCFD respectively
- Helium: Liquefied He from 4RG trains and 3QG trains. 9.2 TPD
3. RLTO & Refining
- The Ras Laffan Terminal Operations (RLTO) and Refining Facilities consist of the following assets:
- LNG Storage and Loading –total 15 LNG tanks for both North and South
- South has total 6 tanks ( 3 Rich LNG tanks and 3 Lean LNG tanks), located on Lot H
- North has total 9 tanks (5 Lean LNG tanks on Lot N and 4 Rich LNG tanks located inside QG North Fence).
- Non-LNG Storage and Loading - tank farms (more than 51 tanks for over 19 liquid products and feedstock), six (6) liquid product berths, and one single point mooring (SPM). The latter is located 56km offshore.
- Laffan Refinery 1 – a 160,600 barrels per stream day (bpsd) condensate refinery.
- Laffan Refinery 2 – a 146,000 bpsd condensate refinery
- Common Sulfur Plant (CSP), and Offsite Facilities (e.g. seawater intakes, product piping corridors)
- Barzan Plants: two trains of NGLs (C3 & C4) and Sales gas.
- Helium recovery plant.
- Future NFE Facilities, which include new four LNG trains, helium facility, new LNG tanks and liquid product tanks as well as sulfur plant.
Offshore facilities are managed under one integrated offshore operating group and include the following assets
a. The Offshore North Facilities include QG1, QG2 and QG3& 4 offshore facilities.
- QG1 – an offshore (North Field Bravo, NFB) complex which bridge- links living quarter, two wellhead platforms (WH1, WH2), process (PR) and utility (PU) platforms and a flare platform. The third wellhead platform (WH3) is located about 5 kilometers away from NFB complex. The three wellhead platforms (with 22 wells) are supplying 1.6 billion standard cubic feet of natural gas per day to Trains 1, 2 and 3 onshore via one 32” dry gas subsea pipeline (82km). Recently a new ‘Additional Living Quarters (ALQ)’ platform has been installed on a 4 Leg Jacket Structure adjacent to existing NFB living quarters platform.
- QG2 - 30 wells, located on three remote wellhead platforms (WH4, WH5, and WH6), supplying 2.9 billion standard cubic feet of natural gas per day to Trains 4 and 5 onshore via one 34” and one 38” wet gas subsea pipelines (91km and 81km respectively).
- QG3/4 - 33 wells located on three remote wellhead platforms (WH7, WH8, and WH9), supplying 2.8 billion standard cubic feet in total of natural gas per day to Trains 6 and 7 onshore via two 38” wet gas subsea pipelines (66km and 62km respectively).
b. The Offshore South Facilities - Total 93 Wells spread over 35 KM area with 11 Well Heads with production capacity of 9.1 BSCF/D.
- The RasGas Alpha (RGA) complex comprises the following bridge connected facilities
- Process and Utilities Platform PT (two process trains comprising Inlet Separator, Condensate Coalescer, Glycol Dehydration System, and Dry Gas Filter Separator, three main power turbine generators, crane, boat landings)
- Wellhead Platform (WH-1) (five producing wells, production manifold, test separator – see generic WHP description below)
- Riser Platform RT (import piping via bridge from WH-1, coolers, 16” import risers from WH-2 and WH-3 infield flowlines, export riser, crane);
- Quarters Platform QT containing Living Quarters (LQ), Muster Areas, control room / helideck and lifeboats
- Additional Living Quarters (ALQ) – an extension to the existing LQ
- Remote flare with intermediate support
- Export pipeline from the riser platform suppling dehydrated gas to the onshore facilities at RLIC.
- WH-1 is integrated into the RGA facilities and is bridge linked to the RT. WH-2 and WH-3 are linked to RT via 16” infield flowlines
- Each WHP consists of integrated 2-level topsides, together with a single wellbay mezzanine deck supported on a 4-pile jacket in water depths of approximately 60m. The platforms have either 9 slots (WH-1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 10, 11) or 12 slots (WH-5, 6, 8, 9).
c. The Barzan Offshore development consists of three wellhead platforms (BRZ-WHP1, BRZ-WHP2, and BRZ-WHP3) to produce 1.9 Bscfd of non-associated gas. All wellhead topsides consist of integrated, 2-level topsides, plus a helideck, a mezzanine deck, and a cellar deck, supported on a 6-pile jacket. Each of the three remote wellhead platforms consists of a 15- drilling-slot wellbay area with 10 pre-drilled wells on each platform (with the remaining wells on each platform to be drilled later). All produced fluids are exported directly to shore through the export pipelines.
d. Future Offshore Facilities include additional platforms as part of North Field Production Sustainability (NFPS) Project and North Field Expansion (NFX) Project, and North Field South (NFS) Project to sustain plateau and increase production from Qatargas production areas.
Scope of Work:
The Scope of Work to be carried out includes HAZID, HAZOP, SIL, Consequence modelling, Safety Incident Investigation, Loss Prevention studies and specialized safety and risk training.
The facilities to be covered under the project are:
1. HAZARD IDENTIFICATION (HAZID) STUDY
HAZID is a technique for early identification of potential hazards and threats from a project, plant, or a plant modification. This will lead to safer and more cost-effective design options being adopted with a minimum cost of change penalty.
The HAZID technique includes the following:
- Means of identifying and describing HSE hazards and risks at the earliest practicable stage of a development or venture.
- Meeting of a highly experienced multi-discipline team using a structured brainstorming technique, based on a checklist of potential HSE issues, to assess the applicability of potential hazards.
- Carry out qualitative risk assessment to risk rank the hazards.
- Rapid identification and description process of potential problem only, not a forum for trying to solve potential problems.
The HAZID shall be a structured approach to determine the potential impacts of the following:
- The surroundings on the facilities
- The facilities on their surroundings
- The facilities on the health
Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) Study
HAZOP study is carried out by a team of engineers from different disciplines. The team looks at each section of a plant or system or operation (node), considering potential deviations from intended operation and analyses their consequences against any existing safeguards. Impact of identified hazards on safety, asset and environment are assessed.
HAZOP study records the identified hazards without proposing any solution, unless a solution is obvious. Proposed solutions may include additional safeguards or operational procedures as necessary. The study record serves as a guide to determine the Health, Safety and Environment (HSE) issues to be resolved during the project.
Quantitative risk assessment (QRA) Study
QRA is a technique used to systematically calculate the risks from hazardous events. It involves predicting the size of consequences associated with a hazard, and the frequency at which a release of the hazard may be expected to occur. These aspects are then combined in order to obtain numerical values for risk – usually risk of fatality.
QRA includes consideration of all identified hazardous events in order to quantify the overall risk levels. Similar hazardous events are often grouped and assessed together as bounding or representative events.
An array of third-party software packages exists for carrying out consequence modelling, frequency assessment or entire QRAs, but many of these calculations are also often done using spreadsheets.
The most important objective of the QRA study is to determine the risk to personnel working under normal operations on the facility within the project. The study will comprise of a number of distinct but interrelated tasks as follows:
- Data collection and review of project documents for the project;
- Identification of potential hazardous events through HAZID reports;
- Development of the QRA methodology and assumptions report;
- Consequence assessment including development of incident scenarios using event tree analysis (ETA);
- Failure frequency analysis;
- Risk evaluation and integration;
- ALARP demonstration;
- Provision of Risk Reduction Measures (RRMs)
Consequence is the degree of harm caused by a hazardous event. Consequence modelling also known as physical effects modelling is a technique in which computer based mathematical modelling is used to predict physical behavior under accident conditions, in order to make a quantitative estimation of risk. A range of models can be used, from simple formulations based upon test correlations to complex numerical methods based on CFD principles. Internationally accepted and validated software will be used.
A variety of models are available to estimate the consequences of the resulting fires, gas dispersion, explosions, etc. The vulnerability of people to these physical effects is determined in terms of probability of fatality using appropriate criteria. The consequence assessment will also identify potential escalation scenarios that may lead to further significant consequences.
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) Assessment & Verification
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) study is an analysis which aims at the determination of the appropriate reliability required from the elements of the Safety Instrumented Functions (SIF) identified in prior safety studies (e.g. HAZOP).
The approach of this guideline is to remove the uncertainty regarding the safety integrity, cost effectiveness and availability requirements, reducing over and under engineering, in a traceable manner.
SIL assignment is based on the amount of risk reduction that is necessary to mitigate the risk associated with the process to a tolerable level. All of the Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS) design, operation and maintenance choices must then be verified against the SIL assigned.
The SIL study of the project shall cover all Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS) in process, vendor package systems, utility systems and Fire & Gas systems associated with ESD systems where there is potential for hazard to human safety, environment or asset / production loss.
SIL study with LOPA Method
The Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) is a semi quantitative technique used for evaluating the risk of hazard scenarios and comparing it against risk tolerance criteria to decide if existing safeguards are adequate in preventing or mitigating the scenarios and additional safeguards are needed.
Independent Protection Layer (IPL)
IPL can be active or passive system or action that is capable of preventing a scenario from proceeding to its undesired consequence, independent of the initiating event or the action of any layer of protection associated with the scenario.
The following safeguards are commonly used in the process industries as independent layers of protection, and should be considered for each SIL selection scenario:
- Basic Process Control System (BPCS)
- Alarms with operator intervention
- Mechanical Integrity
- Local devices (independent of BPCS)
- External Risk Reduction Facility
- Probability of Ignition
- Occupancy Factor
Specialized Safety & Risk Training
The Specialized Safety & Risk workshop will be conducted by IFluids Engineering in accordance with QG’s procedures and internationally accepted standard procedures using a worksheet format and a standard guideword approach.
The period of completion of project is 5 years.
- Organization Chart for execution of work
- CV’s of key personnel involved in execution of work
- Methodology & Work plan
- Detailed schedule including completion of documents such as drawing, data sheet, calculation sheet, diagram, specification, report and mobilization & demobilization
- Drawing, Data sheet, Calculation sheet, Diagram, Specification, Report
- Cost, Time and Resources (CTR)
- QA and QC plan
- Schedule for COMPANY’s mandatory training